1998. The analysis focuses on levels of centralization as the relevant kinds of government. Nearly all of the evidence that we present in Higgins et al. (2006) suggests that government, at any level, hinders economic growth. Furthermore, there is no evidence that government's negative effect on growth diminishes at more decentralized levels.
In this paper we report how the basic Higgins et al. (2006) findings are largely robust to examining (a) subsamples of metro and non-metro counties separately, (b) regional subsamples, and (c) individual US state subsamples. We also (d) employ a more careful selection of valid instruments for our regressions. The basic findings are again robust. We also include documentation that (e) the county-level income distribution widened slightly over the 1970 to 1998 period.
Our 2006 paper primarily focuses on conditional convergence rates in the US.
Determinants of balanced growth paths are given second-order treatment in terms of detail and space. This paper allows us to highlight findings associated with the government employment variable subset of those growth determinants. We find that 2 subset of particular interest and the elaboration of our original findings along the margins of (a) through (e) provides, we believe, a stronger and more thorough argument that government activities are growth-hindering in the US.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the questions of interest in terms of the existing literature and how we add to that literature. Section 3 then briefly discusses the econometric method and data that we employ. Section 4 discusses the empirical findings. Concluding remarks are made in Section 5.
Growth and Government: The Existing Literature
When asking about kinds of US government there are two complementary (and not mutually exclusive) categorizations of interest. One categorization is kinds of government services and inputs to production and has received considerable attention in the literature. A seminal example is Aschauer (1989) who analyzes government military and non-military investment, finding that only non-military government investment is positively associated with state-level economic growth. Alternatively, Holtz-Eakin (1994) finds that government investment has a negative effect or no effect on gross state product (GSP) growth. Evans and Karras (1994) Garcia-Milà et al. (1996) confirm these results. Lynde and Richmond (1993) , to the contrary, use a translog production function specification and find that government investment contributes to output growth while the government capital stock contributes to productivity growth. 2 On the other hand, changes in highway services, health and hospital services, police and fire services, and sewer and sanitation services do not have statistically significant effects.
3 infrastructure component has a positive effect on growth.
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The categorization we explore -namely kinds of government in terms of the level of decentralization -has not received as much attention in the literature. In a sample of 58 countries, an early paper by Oates (1972) Stansel (2005) 3 Different kinds of government services and inputs to production are also a common focus of crosscountry studies. Examples include Atkinson (1995) , Slemrod (1995) , Agel et al. (1997 ), Sala-i-Martin (1997a and 1997b , and Baldacci et al. (2004) . 4 Despite Oates (1972) empirical finding, the relationship between economic growth and fiscal decentralization in general cannot be directly linked to the more specific "decentralization theorem" put forth by Oates in the same work. The decentralization theorem concerns the welfare advantages of localized public goods provision in the absence of "cost-savings from centralized provision" and "interjurisdictional externalities" (p. 72). The theorem only establishes "a presumption in favor of the decentralized provision of public goods with localized effects" (Oates, 1999 (Oates, , p. 1122 . Difficult questions involve, first, whether this implies a presumption that decentralization positively correlates with growth and, second, whether the assumptions underlying that presumption actually hold in a given economy. 5 Studies specific to countries other than the US include Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2008) for Spain and Zhang and Zhou (1998) Higgins et al. (2006 Higgins et al. ( , 2008 and Young et al. (2008) exploit to study convergence in the US. In contrast to the 48-50 state-level observations, or the 314 metropolitan areas studied by Stansel (2005) , our data contain over 3,000 county-level observations.
Employment shares may provide a better measure of many government activities than expenditure shares do. They capture percentages of available labor input that are being directed by a specific level of the public sector (rather than by the decisions of private individuals and firms). To the extent that economically important government activities are labor-intensive, analyzing the effects of employment shares is of interest.
For example, regulatory environments are presumably inherently labor-intensive in that they are not effective without investigative monitoring and enforcement on the ground. Moreover, the large number of cross-sectional observations allows us to study the US as a whole as well as various sub-samples of interest. Metro and non-metro subsamples allow for the possibility that government's effect on economic growth varies with population density and provides a link to the metro area study of Stansel (2005 Following Higgins et al. (2006) , we use a cross-sectional variant of the 3SLS-IV approach of Evans (1997) . However, we improve upon Higgins et al. (2006) in terms of the instruments used. Higgins et al. (2006) employed lagged values of all conditioning variables as instruments. We employ an algorithm that chooses from those lagged values a set of instruments that (i) are valid and (ii) have the highest Shea partial R 2 .
Empirical specification and data
In this section we briefly describe the basic growth regression model and the estimation technique that we apply. We then briefly describe the US county-level data. Finally, since 6 our estimation technique employs instrumental variables, we describe the algorithm that we use to optimally choose a set of instruments conditional on the available data.
The regression model and 3SLS-IV estimation procedure
Our growth regressions involve fitting cross-sectional data to the equation,
where n g is the average growth rate of per capita income for economy n between years 0 and T; y n0 is initial (t = 0) per capita income; n x is a vector of other control variables including government employment shares; β and γ are coefficients; and ν n is a zero mean, finite variance error term. 8 Given our data, 0 ≡ 1970 and T ≡ 1998. 9 Caselli, et al. (1996) and Evans (1997) show that applying OLS to (1) will yield consistent estimates only if the data satisfy highly implausible conditions. 10 Evans (1997) proposes a 3SLS-IV method that produces consistent estimates. In the first two stages, instrumental variables are used to estimate the regression equation,
and n η is the error.
,12
7 Next, we use * β , the estimate from (2), to construct the variable,
In the third stage, we perform an OLS regression of n π on n x :
where τ and γ are parameters and ε n is the error term. This regression yields a consistent estimator, γ * .
US county-level data
The data we use are drawn from several sources but the majority comes from the personnel from all data.
Our data contain 3,058 county-level observations. The large number of observations allows us to explore possible heterogeneity in growth across the US by splitting the data into three sets of subsamples. The first set includes a metro subsample freedom to alleviate this problem and identify coefficients. Indeed, we obtain statistically significant β estimates for the full sample as well as for 32 individual states. 12 As Evans (1997) shows, the derivation of this equation depends on the assumption that the x n variables are constant during the time frame considered, allowing them to be differenced out. Since the difference is only over a single year and these are variables representing broad demographic trends, this does not seem to be unwarranted. To make sure that this did not introduce significant omitted variable bias into our estimations, we ran the IV regression for the full US sample with differenced values of all conditioning variables included as regressors. The point estimate of β from the modified IV fell within the 95 percent confidence interval of the Evans method IV estimate. If β estimates are not significantly affected then neither are the third stage results (see below).
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(867 counties) and a non-metro subsample (2,191 counties). 13 The second set includes 5 regional subsamples: Great Lakes, Northeast, Southern, Plains, and Western. Finally, the third set includes 50 US state subsamples.
We use the BEA's measure of personal income net of government transfers expressed in 1992 dollars. Natural logs of real per capita income are used. The 38 conditioning variables are the same as in Higgins et al. (2006, see Table 1 ) and account for various age and racial demographics, levels of educational attainment, and industry employment composition. 14 For the variables of interest to the present analysis, Table 1 reports some summary statistics for the various samples of US counties. The variables are average per capita income growth from 1970 to 1998 and federal, state, and local government employments as a percents of a county's population. Higgins et al. (2006) used lagged values of conditioning variables as instruments for ∆y n,0 in equation (2). A basic criticism of that paper is that no evidence was presented of those instruments' validity. It is well-known that a valid set of instruments includes variables that are correlated with the endogenous regressors (instrument relevance) but uncorrelated with the error term of the regression (instrument orthogonality). For a given set of instruments, an F-statistic test can be used to assess the former while overidentification tests can be used to assess the latter.
Choice of Instruments
In the case of a single endogenous regressor, such as the case with ∆y n,0 in equation (2), Staiger and Stock (1997) have suggested declaring instruments to be weak 9 (not relevant) if the first-stage F-statistic is less than ten (Stock and Yogo, 2002) . This "rule of thumb" for testing instrument relevance is supported by Baum et al. (2003) . In regard to instrument orthogonality, Deaton (1997) and Stock and Yogo (2002) point out that when several instruments are used, overidentification tests can be applied. In the present case we use Sargan's (1964) overidentification test to assess whether the instruments are correlated with the error process.
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Given the size of our sample and number of independent variables we have a large number of potential instruments. In order to generate a set of valid instruments (i.e, those that address instrument relevance and orthogonality) we apply an algorithm that (i) selects various combinations of available (lagged) conditioning variables such that the system is overidentified, (ii) tests their validity, and (iii) if found valid, uses them in the regression analysis. Our algorithm does not maximize any particular function but rather aids in sifting through all various combinations of valid instruments (i.e., those where the first-stage F-statistic is greater than 10 and that satisfy the Sargan test). From this subset of valid instruments we selected the set that produced the largest first-stage Shea (1997) partial R 2 , 0.3510. Our final set of instruments consists of the following 13 lagged variables: "Age: 18-64 years", "Education: Bachelor +", "Federal government employment", "State government employment", "Local government employment", "Selfemployment", "Agriculture", "Construction", "Manufacturing: durables", "Manufacturing: non-durables", "Health services", "Personal services", and 
Empirical findings
We begin by presenting our empirical estimates of the effect of federal, state, and local government employment (as a percent of a county's population), separately, on US economic growth at the county-level. Estimates are presented for (a) country-wide samples, including metro and non-metro subsamples, (b) regional subsamples, and (c) individual state subsamples. We also informally consider the redistributive role of government which may account for the lack of positive growth effects of government employment. The relationship may, however, be nonlinear. Government expansion may promote growth but only up to a point when further expansion is detrimental to growth at the margin; or it may be the case that government expansion aims to enhancing growth up to a point, and then expansion beyond that point aims at income redistribution (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977) . To check this, we run the full US sample regression including both linear and quadratic government employment share terms. Only for the federal employment share is the quadratic term positive and significant, but the parameter estimates imply that the marginal effect is negative up until the federal government employs over 30 percent of a county's
Full US sample results
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The negative effects are also present at all levels of government employment whether one considers only metro counties or only non-metro counties as indicated by the figures in Table 2 . This suggests that government employment is not positively related to economic growth at higher population densities. Indeed the negative partial correlations are larger for the metro sample than for the non-metro sample at all levels.
Given the apparent robustness of a negative association of government employment with growth, one interpretation is that federal, state and local government activities misallocate resources into relatively (compared to the private sector) inferior production processes. Government lowers total factor productivity, thus lowering balanced growth paths. However, another interpretation may be entertained. Perhaps nongovernment wage growth outpaces government wage growth, and this drives the results. 18 These interpretations are not incompatible in a world where both government and non-government wages approximated marginal products. However, government employment, not being subject to the same market forces, may be different along certain intangible margins (e.g., greater job security; lower expectations of effort; higher psychic benefits associated with providing a public service).
In order to explore the above we have assembled government and nongovernment wage growth data for the sample period ( Table 4 reports the results for our five regional sub-samples: Great Lakes, Northeastern, Southern, Plains and Western. Statistically significant results are harder to come by using these smaller samples, but those significant coefficient estimates are broadly consistent with our full sample findings. The significant coefficient estimates are all negative except for those associated with the non-metro Plains region. For the nonmetro Plains region, notably, positive effects are estimated for all levels of government.
Regional Results and Individual State Results
The statistically significant coefficient estimates that are negative occur, variously, for 19 These results are based on data from 3,066 counties. Our regression analysis utilizes data for 3,058 counties. The difference is due to a lack of some data in eight counties.
13 federal, state, and local government. (Of course, this could simply imply that government activity productivity growth was relatively high.)
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Redistributive Activities
It is possible that the negative correlation between government employment and 20 The non-metro Plains region effects may be associated with relatively fast government wage growth. Federal, state, and local government wage growth, respectively, outpaced non-government wage growth in approximately 62 percent, 68 percent, and 80.32 percent of counties. 21 Given the extensive number of independent variables, our model was only identified in 32 of 50 states. By this we refer to the coefficient on initial income being statistically significant. In the absence of this the interpretation of conditioning variable coefficients is unclear.
14 economic growth is due to the redistributive activities of government. Redistributive activities may be detrimental towards average (per capita) income growth though effective in their specific goals. Furthermore, if greater income equality is valued in and of itself, then trading off growth for equity may be viewed as desirable.
Our analysis cannot separate out the productive and redistributive activities of federal, state, or local governments. However, under the hypothesis that the negative correlation between government employment and economic growth is due to redistributive activities, we can ask whether or not the economic growth has indeed been traded off for a more equitable distribution of income. In other words, we can evaluate a possible redistributive role for the various levels of government given the caveat that we To try to understand further the evolution of the US county-level income distribution, Table 6 summarizes statistics computed from the 1970 and 1998 income distributions. From 1970 to 1998, the skewness of the distribution increased from -0.2244
(to the left) to 1.7240 (to the right). At the same time, kurtosis increased from 3.4334 to 10.3237, implying that the distribution has become more peaked. Cumulatively, this suggests that these two effects have been offsetting to a great extent.
In conclusion, the evidence presented in Young et al. (2008) does not suggest that government activities have achieved (absolutely) a more equal distribution of income at the expense of lower rates of economic growth. Put differently, it suggests government failure at federal, state, and local levels in lieu of evidence that the distribution of countylevel per capita income would have widened significantly in the absence of government activities.
Concluding Remarks
We use US county data containing over 3,000 cross-sectional observations during the period 1970 to 1998 to explore the relationships between economic growth and the size and scope of government at three levels: federal, state and local. In contrast to the extant literature that has used taxes, government expenditures and government capital stocks to proxy for the extent of government, here we focus on government employment shares.
Following Higgins, et al. (2006) , we use a 3SLS-IV estimation technique and report on the full sample of US counties, as well as metro and non-metro subsamples, and 5 regional and 32 individual state subsamples. Federal, state and local government employment shares almost always negatively correlate with growth (when statistical significance holds) across samples.
We find no evidence that government is more effective at more or less decentralized levels. Furthermore, while we cannot separate out the productive and redistributive services of government, we document that income inequality in the US has widened slightly from 1970 to1998. However, the change in both the standard deviation of per capita income and the Gini coefficient are small enough to suggest that both dispersion and equality remained essentially the same.
Given the ostensible goals of higher growth and/or a more equitable distribution of income, our findings are not supportive of expanding the roles of government, in terms of employment, at any level. While government is often invoked as a solution to market failures, the evidence points to government failure as a more important, and negative, influence in the economy. Our findings suggest a rolling back of government activities;
specifically for a release of government-employed labor inputs to the private sector.
The most important and obvious caveat to our findings is that we cannot disaggregate government employment into specific government activities, e.g. infrastructure development. Despite examining federal, state, and local government separately, we must view each level of government as a given package of activities and services. Still, our results are consistent with the conclusion that, as currently composed, a shrinking of government at any and all levels of decentralization would be a desireable policy. Significance levels are indicated by "a" for 1 percent, "b" for 5 percent, and "c" for 10 percent.
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